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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANET S. PEREZ, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, : 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, : Appellate Case No. 20050895-CA 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR THIS APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction of this petition for review pursuant to Section 78-2 a-
3(2)(a), Utah Code, "final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies...." 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The central issue in mis case is whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly 
concludes that a parcel of real property held by the Atticus Family Trust pursuant to an 
Irrevocable Trust Agreement dated September 15, 1992 (hereafter sometimes "Trust" or 
"Trust Agreement") is an asset of the petitioner, Janet S. Perez (hereafter "petitioner" or 
"Mrs. Perez") which disqualifies Mrs. Perez from Medicaid assistance on the grounds 
that its value exceeds the Medicaid asset limit. The standard of review of this issue is 
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essentially a correction of error standard involving interpretation and construction of the 
Irrevocable Trust Agreement, in light of Utah law, and the applicable Medicaid statutes 
and regulations. Section 63-46b-16(4)(d), Utah Code; Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 811 P. 2d 664, 160 U. A. R. 5, (Utah, 1991); Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P. 2d 601 (Utah, 1983). Cf 
Bleazardv. Utah Department of Health, 861 P. 2d 1048, 220 U A. R 33 (1993), "This 
appeal requires us to construe federal and state statutes, regulations and rules governing 
the Medicaid program. Thus, it presents questions of law and 'we accord no particular 
deference to the agency decision... but review... for correctness.' Allen v. Department 
of Health, 850 P. 2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1993)." 861 P. 2d at 1049. Similarly, 
interpretation of the Trust Agreement is essentially a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness, no deference being given to the finder of fact. Fairbourn Commercial, 
Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, 94 P. 3d 292,^6. 
The following specific issues are significant to determination of the central issue 
described above: 
A. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly concludes that Mrs. Perez 
is a "beneficiary" of the entire corpus of the Trust on the basis of the general definition of 
"beneficiary" found at Section 75-7-103, Utah Code, rather than the terms of the Trust 
Agreement itself, which limits any interest of Mrs. Perez to an undisputedly valueless 
lifetime use right. The standard of review is identical to that set forth for issue one 
above. 
2 
B. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly fails to find that any 
interest of Mrs. Perez in the trust property is a valueless lifetime use right, based on the 
evidence presented at hearing. This issue is reviewed on a substantial evidence standard, 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code, however, there is no evidence in the record 
disputing Mrs. Perez' evidence regarding value. The hearing officer did not reach this 
question of fact due to his interpretation of the Trust Agreement. 
C. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly concludes that all trust 
property not specifically gifted to the named beneficiaries constitutes Mrs. Perez9 
"separate estate," rather than trust corpus which the successor trustees may distribute only 
according to the terms of the trust, which terms do not include any power to distribute to 
Mrs. Perez. The standard of review for this issue is identical to that set forth for issue 
one above. 
D. Whether the Final Agency Order incorrectly concludes that the 
successor trustees have succeeded to Mrs. Perez' reserved power to alter the beneficial 
interest under the Trust Agreement. The standard of review for this issue is identical to 
that set forth for issue one above. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
42 U. S. C. 1396a(k): 
(1) In the case of a medicaid qualifying trust (described in paragraph (2)), the 
amounts from the trust deemed available to a grantor... is the maximum 
amount of payments that may be permitted under the terms of the trust to be 
distributed to the grantor, assuming the full exercise of discretion by the trustee 
or trustees for the distribution of the maximum amount to the grantor. For 
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purposes of the previous sentence, the term "grantor" means the individual 
referred to in paragraph (2). 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, a "medicaid qualifying trust" is a trust, or 
similar legal device, established (other than by will) by an individual... under 
which the individual may be the beneficiary of all or part of the payments from 
the trust and the distribution of such payments is determined by one or more 
trustees who are permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the 
distribution to the individual. 
(3) This subsection shall apply without regard to-
(A) Whether or not the medicaid qualifying trust is irrevocable or is 
established for purposes other than to enable the grantor to qualify for medical 
assistance under this subchapter; or 
(B) Whether or not the discretion described in paragraph (2) is actually 
exercised. 
Section 75-5-503, Utah Code: 
"A power of attorney may not be construed to grant authority to an 
attorney-in-fact or agent to perform any of the following, unless expressly 
authorized in the power of attorney: 
(1) create, modify, or revoke an inter vivos revocable trust created 
by the principal...." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for review of a Final Agency Order of the Utah Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing (hereafter sometimes the "Department of 
Health"), based on a recommended decision by hearing officer, Douglas Jensen, denying 
Mrs. Perez medicaid benefits based on imputation to her of the value of a tract of land 
^tuated in Kane County, Utah, owned by the Atticus Family Trust pursuant to a 
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September 15, 1992 Irrevocable Trust Agreement 
2. Course of Proceedings. 
On October 12, 2004, the Department of Health issued a Notice of Decision to 
Mrs. Perez denying her medicaid benefits on the grounds that her assets exceeded the 
$2,000.00 Medicaid asset limit (R 5, 125). Mrs. Perez, through family, requested a 
hearing on that denial. Ibid. On May 23, 2005, hearing convened (R 124). Following 
hearing, the hearing officer issued a Recommended Decision, (R 124-133), which the 
Department of Health adopted as its Final Agency Order (R 122). Mrs. Perez has 
appealed to this court. 
3. Agency Disposition 
On September 2, 2005, the Department of Health issued a Final Agency Order 
confirming their prior Notice of Decision denying Medicaid benefits to Mrs. Perez (R 
122). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mrs. Perez is 65 years old (R 71). 
2. Since January 22, 2004, she has resided at the Kane County Skilled Nursing 
Facility, where she suffers from meningioma (cancer of the covering of the brain) and 
hydrocephalus (Ibid). 
3. Mrs. Perez has an advance case of meningioma. Her son, Rob Perez, testified 
that communication with Mrs. Perez is very difficult, sometimes she responds, other 
times she stares blankly and is not responsive to any stimulus (Tr. 55). Mrs. Perez' 
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daughter, Rene Pace, testified that Mrs. Perez cannot get out of bed on her own, she 
cannot feed herself, and she can't hold hands for lack of strength in her arms (Tr. 56). 
Sometimes Mrs. Perez says to Rene that she loves her, but other times she just blankly 
stares, even saying that she has not seen her daughter Rene when Rene is standing in 
front of her (Tr. 56). 
4. Mrs. Perez was first diagnosed with a brain tumor in 1977 (Tr 54). Surgery 
followed that same year and Mrs. Perez recovered and was re-employed (Tr. 55). 
5. Meningioma is a very slow moving condition (Ibid). It was not until 
December, 2003 that Mrs. Perez began a very marked decline in her condition, going 
from being able to get up on her own, feeding herself, and carrying on coherent 
conversations to her present condition in the period of about one month (Tr. 57). 
6. Today, Mrs. Perez is confused most of the time and unable to care for herself 
outside of a stilled nursing facility (Tr. 86). 
1. Mrs. Perez' physician, Dr. Jonathan Bowman states that Mrs. Perez "is 
completely dependent on skilled nursing care for her daily needs. She is bed-bound most 
of the day and is only able to be transferred to a wheelchair with a lift." (R 72). 
8. Dr. Bowman concludes that Mrs. Perez "is confused most of the time and is 
unable to make daily decisions due to her mental status. She would not be able to care 
for herself outside of a skilled nursing facility" (Ibid). 
9. On September 15, 1992, Mrs. Perez, with her sister, Roberta Jean Flournoy, 
established the Atticus Family Trust by Irrevocable Trust Agreement of that date (R 31). 
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10. The Atticus Family Trust has no bank account and no cash assets of any 
kind, its sole asset being a 50 acre tract of land in Kane County (R 55-57). 
11. Rene Pace testified that this 50 acre tract of land is approximately two-thirds 
gully or canyon with a creek running through it (Tr. 60). It is the same general area 
where a local boy was killed when a canyon wall collapsed earlier in 2005 (Ibid). 
12. The property is very sandy (Tr. 60). The portion of the property up out of 
the canyon has large sink holes (Ibid). 
13. The Trust Agreement has an unusual provision that "[i]n the event of erosion 
of a beneficiary's Vi acre choice of land, rendering the land unsuitable for a homesite," 
the site "can be extended, provided only that said extended portion does not encroach on 
another beneficiary's homesite selection, or a different site can be selected" (R. 37). 
14. One of the selected homesites has a mobile home on it which is now 
dangerously close to the canyon and which has been condemned by the building 
inspectors (Tr. 61). No one lives there (Ibid). 
15. In a period of about nine years, the area behind the condemned mobile home 
has eroded 6-8 feet so that the small fence around the back of the mobile home is now on 
the edge of the canyon (Tr. 64). 
16. The travel trailer referred to in the Trust Agreement, Article IV(A)(2), was 
removed four to five years ago due to its condition (Tr. 64, 76). 
17. There is no fence around the property and the property has a lot of sagebrush, 
with no grassy areas (Tr. 60, 63). Rene Pace opined that a cow feeding there "would not 
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last very long" (Tr.77). 
18. The eastern boundary of the property appears to follow the creek bottom but 
there are no water rights with the property, and no rights to water cattle from the creek 
(Tr. 65, 77). 
19. None of the three witnesses supporting petitioner at the hearing could 
conceive of any way in which a right to use the property for Mrs. Perez' lifetime could 
have any marketable value (Tr. 79). 
20. The witnesses for the Department of Health acknowledged that none of them 
had ever looked at the property (Tr. 38). 
21. Mrs. Perez' sister, Roberta Jean Flournoy, with whom Mrs. Perez 
established the Atticus Family Trust, died in March approximately two years before the 
hearing (Tr. 50). 
22. The name Atticus Family Trust relates to family history and demonstrates an 
intent to create a safe haven for the family (Tr. 67-69). 
23. The Department of Health denied benefits on the basis of Kane County's 
assessment of the property which placed its value at $82,219.00 (R. 5, 96). 
24. Petitioner here summarizes key provisions of the Trust Agreement: 
A. By the Preamble and Article I of the Trust Agreement, petitioner, Janet 
Pace Perez, as Trustor, establishes the Atticus Family Trust, with herself and her sister, 
Roberta Jean Flournoy, as trustees and transferred to the Trust the property described 
above. (R. 34, 55-57). 
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B. By Article IV, Trustor "irrevocably gifts beneficial ownership in the 
Trust to her children Rene' Elizabeth Pace Tulak and Roberta Thomas Perez, and her 
niece and nephew, Jean Virginia Jiroudek, aka Jean V. Flournoy and Thomas Ronald 
Jiroudek." (R 35). 
C. By Article IV(A)(1), Trustor "reserves to her children and niece and 
nephew named above for their exclusive use a minimum of lA acre each . . . to be used as 
a homesite for each beneficiary, for such beneficiary's use. . . ." (R. 35-36). 
D. By Article IV(A)(2), "Trustees Janet Pace Perez [petitioner] and/or 
Roberta Jean Flournoy shall be entitled to use and enjoyment of the property for their 
lifetimes...." (R. 36). 
E. By Article IV(A)(4), homesites can be adjusted in event of erosion. (R 
37). 
F. By Article IV(A)(7), "[t]he Trust may use the 'common9 land for 
purposes of generating income," so long as certain conditions are met, including 
sufficient income to support expenses, compliance with law, land preservation, and no 
undue hardship on the beneficiaries." (R 37-38). 
G. By Article IV(C), Trustor, "shall have the power to alter the terms of 
the use or disposition of the property during her lifetime, provided that she may not 
pledge the property for the benefit of her individual creditors, or change any homesite of 
the beneficiaries after a homesite is selected and the beneficiary has made material 
improvements to the homesite. Until then, the Trustor may modify the beneficial 
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interests regarding the homesite. Other than the homesite, the Trustor reserves the right 
to change the beneficial interest as she may wish." (R 38). 
H. By Article V(A), "[djuring the lifetime of the Trustor, the Trustee may 
pay to the beneficiaries, in the discretion of the Trustee, the up-to-the net income of the 
Trust Estate " (R 38). 
I. By Article V(B), "[i]f Trustor or any Beneficiary shall come under any 
physical or mental disability, in addition to the net income of the Trustor's separate 
estate, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Trustor so much of the 
principal of the disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall deem necessary for 
the Trustor's proper support, health, and maintenance, to be paid out of all beneficiaries' 
shares, as the case may be, provided that no payment shall be made where other means of 
support are available, including insurance, or public assistance." (R 39). 
J. By Article VI, "[u]pon the death of the Trustor, the Trustee shall 
marshall the assets of the trust estate . . . and do the following: 
"(1) Divide the Estate into four (4) equal shares of beneficial interest 
[for the four beneficiaries].... 
"(2) The surviving Co-Trustees may thereafter liquidate and 
distribute the Trust to the beneficiaries [upon affirmative vote]. . . If not so liquidated 
(partially or fully) the property shall continue to be held in trust with the property 
administered for the benefit of the beneficiaries " (R 40). 
K. By Article IX(A), if "either Trustee resigns or is unable to act for any 
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reason, the following shall act as Successor Trustee, in the order named: 
"1. The survivor of the initial Trustees. 
"2. Robert Thomas Perez and Thomas Ronald Jiroudek as Co-
Trustees, with a majority of the beneficiaries as set forth in Article HI." (R 44). 
L. By Article XI(K)(1), "If at any time the Trustee (or Successor Trustee, 
as the case may be) shall receive a written statement signed by a Trustor's or Trustee's 
personal physician (or a specialist approved by such personal physician, or any two other 
licensed physicians) stating that he considers a Trustor or a Trustee to be so mentally or 
physically incapacitated as to be substantially unable to manage his or her financial 
resources and affairs effectively... such Trustor or Trustee shall be considered 
incapacitated...." (R. 49). 
M. By Article XI(K)(2), "[i]f a Trustor or Trustee is determined to be 
incapacitated as provided above, then, during the period of such incapacity (a) if such 
Trustor or Trustee is then acting as a trustee hereunder, he shall be deemed to have 
resigned.... (c) the Trustee shall have power and authority on such incapacitated 
Trustor's or Trustee's behalf to exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or 
obligation whatsoever that such Trustor or Trustee may have, relating to any person, 
matter, transaction, or property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, whether in the 
trust estate or owned by Trustor or Trustee including, without limitation, power to 
transfer to himself as Trustee upon the terms set forth in this agreement any property 
owned by Trustor or Trustee. The power granted under (c) above shall be construed and 
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interpreted as a general durable power of attorney to act as such Trustor's attorney in fact 
and agent in his name and for his benefit and shall be in addition to all other powers 
bestowed upon the Trustee by this agreement." (R. 50). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Nowhere in the Trust Agreement is there any provision granting to Mrs. Perez 
anything other than the lifetime use right set forth in Article IV(A)(2). By Mrs. Perez' 
undisputed hearing evidence, this lifetime use right is valueless, considering the nature 
and limitations of the subject real property, which property is the only asset of the Trust. 
By Article IV(A), Mrs. Perez "irrevocably gifts beneficial ownership in the Trust 
to" four named beneficiaries. Mrs. Perez is not one of these. Upon the death of the Mrs. 
Perez, her successor trustee(s) are to divide and distribute the trust estate among these 
same four named beneficiaries. There simply is no basis for concluding, as the hearing 
officer did, that Mrs. Perez is a beneficiary of the entire corpus of this irrevocable trust, 
which ultimately vests in her surviving beneficiaries only after her death. 
The Trustee(s) reserved power to invade principal of Mrs. Perez' "separate estate" 
in Article V(B) reaches nothing which violates the Medicaid asset limit because the only 
"separate estate" which can be identified anywhere is her undisputedly valueless lifetime 
use right. 
The Trustor's reserved power under Article IV(C), to alter the terms of the use or 
disposition of the property during her lifetime cannot include the power to make herself a 
beneficiary of the trust because she has already gifted, irrevocably, the beneficial interest 
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under the trust to the four named beneficiaries. In any case, this reserved power died 
with Mrs. Perez' mind since, as a matter of law, a general power of attorney such as that 
created by Article XI(K)(2), does not include an amendment power unless expressly 
granted by empowering document. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner does not dispute application of 42 U. S. C. A. Section 1396a(k)(l), 
relied on by the hearing officer, that in determining the medicaid asset limit the amount 
deemed available to the petitioner is "the maximum amount of payments that may be 
permitted under the terms of the trust to be distributed to the grantor, assuming full 
exercise of discretion by the trustee or trustees for the distribution of the maximum 
amount to the grantor." Petitioner submits, however, that only a strained and improbable 
construction of the Trust, such as that created by the hearing officer, allows the trustees to 
do anything which violates the Medicaid asset limit. 
There is no clause in the Trust naming Mrs. Perez as a beneficiary of the Trust. 
Article IV(A) identifies four beneficial interests and names four beneficiaries. Mrs. 
Perez is not one of these. Article VI directs distribution of the trust assets to these same 
four named beneficiaries on Mrs. Perez' death. Obviously, Mrs. Perez is not one of 
these. No clause in the Trust identifies Mrs. Perez as one of the beneficiaries of the 
Trust. 
Article IV(A)(2) reserves to Mrs. Perez and her sister a "right to use and 
enjoyment of the property for their lifetimes," but this is a far different right from the full 
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beneficial interest in the trust corpus granted to the four named beneficiaries. 
The hearing officer concluded that Mrs. Perez "is a beneficiary of the trust during 
her lifetime because she has a present beneficial interest in 48 acres of the property" and 
that further, "[a]s an incapacitated person, she is currently entitled to the net income and 
principal from the trust." (R. 125). 
The hearing officer justifies his conclusion by citation to Section 75-7-103, Utah 
Code, that a "beneficiary" is a "person that (i) has a present or fixture beneficial interest in 
a trust, vested or contingent." Even if statutory definition is substituted for reasonable 
trust construction to detennine that Mrs. Perez is a "beneficiary" of the Trust, the next 
logical question must be what is the nature of Mrs. Perez' interest in the trust property? 
It certainly cannot be the ultimate benefit of distribution from the Trust upon Mrs. Perez' 
death since that is granted to four named individuals other than Mrs. Perez. It can only 
be whatever interest is reserved by the terms of the trust to the Mrs. Perez. That interest 
is a limited lifetime use right only, which obviously terminates at Mrs. Perez' death. 
At hearing, Mrs. Perez presented extensive evidence that her lifetime right to use 
the property is valueless. Mrs. Perez admits that the property has an assessed value on 
the records of Kane County, but this value is necessarily based on conveyance of the fee 
interest in the property to a third party—something which Mrs. Perez no longer do since 
she conveyed the property instead to this irrevocable trust. The hearing officer made no 
findings on this evidence. The only basis for not doing so is the improbable conclusion 
that Mrs. Perez' interest in the trust property is identical to that of the four named 
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beneficiaries, which clearly is not the case. 
InPerrenoud, etal, v. Harman, etal, 2000 UTApp241, 8 P. 3d293, this court 
considered and stated certain rules of construction applicable to trusts, citing to and 
quoting from Makoffv. Makoff, 528 P. 2d 797 (Utah, 1974). First, '"The general rules 
of construction of written instruments apply to the construction of trust instruments, and 
those rules require a determination of the intention of the settlor where the creation of the 
trust is a unilateral matter."9 Ibid, %13. If the trust is a written instrument, "the intention 
of the settlor must be ascertained from the language thereof, and the court may not go 
outside of the language in an effort to give effect to what it thinks the intent was." Ibid. 
However, ascertaining the intention of the settlor does involve consideration of the 
66
entire instrument aided by surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the creation 
of the trust." Ibid. Thus, in Perrenoud, the "'entire instrument9" was considered in 
order to determine the effect of an addendum. Ibid. 
Mrs. Perez submits that no reasonable and harmonious construction of the Trust 
can conclude that Mrs. Perez9 interest in the trust property is equal to that of the named 
beneficiaries. Repeatedly, the term "beneficiary" is used in the Trust in circumstances 
which obviously do not include Mrs. Perez: Article III refers to a quorum of 
"beneficiaries" after Mrs. Perez death. Article IV allows selection of one-half acre 
homesites for each "beneficiary's use." Article IV(B) prohibits a "beneficiary" from 
adding to the Trust but allows the initial trustees to do so. Article VI, dealing with 
distribution after the death of Mrs. Perez, repeatedly uses the term "beneficiary" to refer 
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only to her survivors. Thus, while Mrs. Perez has a lifetime use right to the property, that 
is all she has. She does not have a disqualifying beneficial interest in or to the corpus of 
the Trust. 
The hearing officer is correct that at the hearing there was "much discussion," (R 
129), of the impact of Section V(B) of the Trust: "If Trustor or any Beneficiary shall 
come under any physical or mental disability, in addition to the net income of the 
Trustor's separate estate, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Trustor so 
much of the principal of the disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall deem 
necessary for the Trustor's proper support, health, and maintenance, to be paid out of all 
beneficiaries' shares, as the case may be, provided that no payment shall be made where 
other means of support are available, including insurance, or public assistance." 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
The most obvious meaning of this clause is that Mrs. Perez may have accumulated, 
by the time of her disability, a valuable estate separate and apart from this Trust. This 
clause allows her successor trustees to pay disability related expenses of Mrs. Perez or 
any beneficiary from Mrs. Perez' separate estate and property. In fact, Mrs. Perez has no 
valuable separate property, so the clause simply has no application. 
However, the Department of Health cited this clause in support of their claim that 
the Trustees had a general power to pay Mrs. Perez' disability related expenses out of the 
Trust (R. 115). For this reason, Mrs. Perez' case presentation at the hearing included 
consideration of the potential benefits Mrs. Perez might have by reason of her lifetime 
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right to use the property, which right is arguably part of her "separate estate/' since it is 
reserved to her by Article IV(A)(2). Mrs. Perez' evidence was unopposed by any 
contrary evidence from the Department of Health. Mrs. Perez' evidence demonstrated 
that, considering the nature and condition of the property, this lifetime use right had no 
value. 
Incredibly, the hearing officer concluded that "the entire 48 acres of 'ungifted' 
property remain the petitioner's 'separate estate,'" (R. 130). There simply is no sense to 
this conclusion. Mrs. Perez placed the entire property irrevocably in trust, to be 
administered according to the terms of the trust. Having done so, Mrs. Perez had no 
estate or interest in the trust property except as reserved by the terms of the trust. To 
conclude otherwise, as the hearing officer did, is to stand the entire law of trusts on its 
head. It is tantamount to saying that this irrevocable conveyance in fact has no legal 
significance-this trust property is still Mrs. Perez' separate property despite the Trust 
Agreement. Clearly this conclusion cannot be sustained. 
Petitioner does not dispute the conclusion of the hearing officer that "it is not until 
the death of the petitioner that her children and niece and nephew are entitled to 
ownership of any property beyond their previously selected Vi-acre sites as stated in 
Article VI " (R. 130). By the same token, it is also correct that the general trust 
corpus is not the separate property of the petitioner. The property has been placed, 
irrevocably, in trust. While there and until distribution following petitioner's death, it is 
neither the separate property of the four named beneficiaries nor the separate property of 
17 
the petitioner. It is trust property to be administered by the trustees under the terms of the 
trust. Unless this court is prepared to conclude, for some unknown reason, that this trust 
has no legal significance whatsoever, this court cannot sustain the conclusion of the 
hearing officer that the petitioner's "separate estate" extends beyond a limited lifetime 
use right, which is undisputedly valueless. 
The hearing officer's decision also mentions a reserved right in Petitioner to 
amend the trust, which right is stated in Article IV(C) as follows: "Trustor shall have the 
power to alter the terms of the use or disposition of the property during her lifetime," 
including the reserved right "to change the beneficial interest as she may wish." (R. 38, 
128). However, it is beyond dispute that the petitioner lacks capacity to amend the trust. 
Her physician has stated that since her admission to the Skilled Nursing Facility "she has 
been neither physically nor mentally capable of managing her own financial affairs," (R. 
71), and in the Recommended Decision below the petitioner is "acknowledged as 
disabled." (R. 128). Nevertheless, the hearing officer concludes that the "successor 
trustees now hold the authority to take any and all actions originally granted to the 
petitioner as Trustor and original Trustee of the trust." (R 129). 
It is incorrect to conclude that the successor trustees of the trust have the legal 
ability to alter the terms of the trust so as to extend petitioner's interest in the trust 
beyond her limited and valueless lifetime use right. By the terms of Article XI(K)(2) of 
the trust, the trustees have "(c) . . . power and authority... to perform any act, power, 
duty, right or obligation whatsoever that such Trustor or Trustee may have . . . [which] 
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power granted to the Trustee under (c) above shall be construed and interpreted as a 
general durable power of attorney in fact and agent in his name and for his benefit . . . " 
[Emphasis supplied.] (R. 50). Under Utah law, specifically Section 75-5-503, Utah 
Code, a "power of attorney may not be construed to grant authority to an attorney-in-fact 
or agent to . . . (1) create, modify, or revoke an inter vivos revocable trust created by the 
principal...," unless such a power to amend is "expressly authorized in the power of 
attorney." Therefore, the specter of creating an additional right or conferring an 
additional benefit on petitioner which violates the Medicaid asset limit does not exist as 
no power to amend is expressly named as a power which inures to the successor trustees. 
While Section 75-5-503, Utah Code, specifically mentions "revocable" trusts, it's 
underlying policy should be held to apply also to amendable, irrevocable trusts. The 
reasons for the limitation on the holder of the power of attorney apply regardless of 
whether the Trust is revocable or irrevocable: the holder of a mere power of attorney 
should not have authority to alter a person's lifetime property dispositions. The 
probability is that the drafters of Section 75-5-503 simply did not anticipate an 
amendable irrevocable trust. Moreover, Section 75-5-503, Utah Code, simply restates 
the law of agency as it applies to existing agreements: "The rule is quite universal that 
the power to execute a contract or agreement does not grant authority to vary the 
agreement after it has been executed, nor is the power to vary an agreement after 
execution inferred from a general power to make it." Agency §85, 3 Am Jur 2d 488 
(1962). Therefore, there is no power in any current trustee of the Trust to alter the Trust 
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so as to grant to Mrs. Perez any beneficial interest in the Trust which would disqualify 
her from Medicaid benefits. 
It bears asking that even if none of this were accurate, and Mrs. Perez were 
competent to amend her trust, how would she do so to extend a benefit to herself beyond 
the limited and valueless lifetime use right which she already has? She cannot take the 
fee of the trust property back to herself because she has placed it already in trust, 
irrevocably, and it makes no sense whatsoever for her to make herself a beneficiary of the 
trust, since she would then take a beneficial interest in the fee of the trust property only 
after her death. There simply is no realistic amendment scenario under which Mrs. 
Perez' lifetime use right under the Trust can be enlarged so as to disqualify her from 
Medicaid benefits. 
Finally, at the hearing, there was argument that the Trust assets should be 
considered disqualifying assets if for no reason other than that the Successor Trustees 
might be friendly to the Petitioner, do as they please, and allow distribution to the 
Petitioner just because they wanted to do so, or just because everybody involved decided 
to allow it to happen. 
This kind of argument was considered and specifically rejected by the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of New York in Verdow Ex Rel Meyer v. 
Sutkowy, 209 F. R D, 309 (N. D. N. Y., 2002). Verdow involved a certified class action 
in which the plaintiffs were elderly nursing home residents who had established 
irrevocable trusts. In administering the Medicaid program, the State adopted a broad 
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ranging "any circumstances" test for cfcsqualification-if there was any remote possibility 
of benefit to these plaintiffs from their trusts, then the plaintiffs should be disqualified 
from Medicaid benefits. Though the plaintiffs9 trusts were irrevocable, the terms of their 
trusts allowed them to appoint or change beneficiaries, and New York law allowed for 
revocation of any Trust, even an irrevocable one, if all beneficiaries consent. The State 
argued that because the plaintiffs could alter their trusts to include beneficiaries who were 
friendly to them and therefore amenable to revocation of their otherwise irrevocable 
trusts, all trust assets should be considered available to the plaintiffs. 
The District Court rejected this argument as "entirely speculative," 209 R R D. at 
316, holding that "the decision of whether or not to provide Medicaid benefits should not 
be based on the remote possibility of collusion," ibid, instead concluding as a matter of 
law that despite the plaintiffs reserved powers to control who benefitted from their trusts 
"there are no possible circumstances under which payment from the corpus of the 
irrevocable trusts could be made to or for the benefit of plaintiffs." Ibid. 
In the present case, Mrs. Perez is entitled to the same treatment. The possibility 
of other disposition based on remote possibilities or unwarranted speculation is not a 
basis for imputation of trust assets to Mrs. Perez, as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Final Agency Order should be reversed. Since no contrary evidence as to the 
value of Mrs. Perez' lifetime use right was presented at hearing, there is no factual basis 
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on which Mrs. Perez could be denied benefits on remand. The Department of Health 
should be ordered to extend Medicaid benefits to Mrs. Perez. 
Respectfully submitted this I /"ttay of January, 2006. 
L. Edward Robbins 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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Health Care Financing 
Michael I Dcil\ 
Di\ ision Dili Uor 
J \NETS PERFZ 
Petitioner 
vs 
U TAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent 
FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Case No 04-350 88 
IF YOU ARE NOT SA ITSFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUF-ST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED IF YOU WOULD 
IIKF TO APPFAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THF UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS 
SIGNED IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A 
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH IF YOU HAVE 
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed puisuant to Section 63-465-12 
Utah Code Ann 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Piocedure," and Department of 
Health Administrative Rule R410 14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing 
Administrative Heanng Procedures foi Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and 
Piovideis " 
I hercb} adopt Recommended Decision No. 04-350-88 in its entirety. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) da>s aftei the date that this Final Agency Oidei is issued, you may file a 
written lequest (or reconsideiation with the Director ot the Division of Health Care Financing 
An> lequest for reconsideiation must state the specific grounds upon which ichef is iequested 
The filing of such a request is not a pierequisite for seeking judicial ieview 
)f j i ir 1 me *i 
< ' i '( h h 
288 Noiih 1460 Wcsl • Salt I 
Milling Addfcsv I 'O Ho\ 141101 • Vfflfl i 1 ikyC wp l* j>4 l 1101 
fih ulah ^o\ 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty 
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a lequest for reconsideration is 
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration The petition shall be 
served upon the Director of Health Caie Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon 
which review is sought Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may 
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order 
A cop> of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last 
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested 
DATED this r y> day ol September 2005 
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vs RECOMMENDED DECISION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. 04-350-88 
Douglas Jensen 
Hearing Officer 
Pursuant to Rule R4I0-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administtative 
Pioceduies Act, Section 63-46b-l et seq , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, a foimal 
administrate e telephonic hcanng foi the above captioned case was held on Monday, May 23, 
2005 The petitioner, a musing home resident, did not appear but was represented by L Edwaid 
Robbins, attorncy-at-law. Present for the petitioner and presenting testimony were daughtei, 
Rene Pace, son and attoincy-m-fact, Robert Perez, and nephew, Tom Jiroudek. The respondent 
was represented by Jean Hendrickson, assistant attorney geneial, Elaine Jensen, case manager 
with the Bureau of Eligibility Services (BES), and Sandra Woodbury, supervisor with BES. 
ISSUE 
DID THE MEDICAID AGENCY CORRECTLY DENY THE PETITIONER'S 
APPLICATION BECAUSE THE ASSET CONTAINED WITHIN THE ATTICUS FAMILY 
TRUST WAS AN AVAILABLE ASSET? 
SJ 
The petitioner, Janet Perez, entered the Kane County Nursing Home on January 22, 2004. An 
application for Nursing Home (NH) Medicaid benefits was submitted in her behalf on 
September 14, 2004. During the eligibility determination process, the Medicaid agency was 
informed that the petitioner had created a trust in September 1992. The Medicaid agency 
determined that the assets contained in that trust were available to the petitioner and further 
determined that the value of the trust assets exceeded the $2,000.00 Medicaid asset limit. A 
Notice of Decision was sent to the petitioner on October 12, 2004, informing her that the 
Medicaid application had been denied due to excess assets. The petitioner (and/or those acting 
for the petitioner) disagreed with the agency action and requested a hearing on December 13, 
2004, seeking to dispute the denial. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner, Janet Perez, is a 65 year-old, widowed female. She entered the Kane 
County Nursing Home on or around January 22, 2004, for long-term institutional care. 
She continues to reside in that facility. 
2. The petitioner suffers from meningioma (cancer of the covering of the brain) and 
hydrocephalus which has made her completely dependent on skilled nursing care for her 
daily needs. 
3. The Atticus Family Trust (the trust) was cieated on September 15, 1992. 
4. A Quit-Claim Deed was completed on September 15, 1992, wherein Janet Pace Perez, 
grantor, quit-claimed the property (described in Exhibit A of the trust) to the Atticus 
Family Trust, Janet Pace Perez and Roberta Jean Flournoy trustees. 
5. The property transferred to the trust is 50 acres of land located outside or near Kanab, 
Utah. A 2003 Kane County Notice of Property Valuation and Tax Charges valued the 
ptoperty at $82,219.00 ($17,000.00 as Primary Improved Property and $65,219.00 as 
Agricultural Land). 
6. The petitioner is a beneficiary of the trust during her lifetime because she has a present 
beneficial interest in 48 acres of the property. As an incapacitated person, she is 
currently entitled to the net income and principal from the trust. 
7. The current trustees have the legal authority and responsibility to act for the benefit o[ 
the petitioner in accordance with the terms of the trust. Distributions from the trust are 
determined by the current trustees and they are permitted to exercise full discretion with 
respect to such distributions. 
8. Undue hardship does not exist because the petitioner (i.e., those acting for the petitioner) 
has not exhausted all legal means to gain access to the trust. 
i 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Atticus Family Tiust is a Medicaid Qualifying Trust and the asset contained within the trust 
is an available asset within the Medicaid piogram as described in sec 1902(k) of the Social 
Secunt> Act 
REASONS FOR HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
The Medicaid piogiam was enacted in J965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act (the Act) 
as a cooperative federal state progiam designed to provide health care payment for necd> 
individuals Pnor to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, the Medicaid statute 
governing tiusts was found in Sec 1902(k) of the Act Because the Atticus Family Trust was 
created prior to 1993, that statute remains operable in deciding this case The statute leads in 
it's entirety 
(1) In the case of a Medicaid qualifying trust (described in paragraph (2)), the amounts 
from the trust deemed available to a grantor, for purposes of subsection (a)(17), is the 
maximum amount of payments that ma> be permitted under the teims of the trust to be 
distributed to the grantor assuming the lull exercise of discretion by the trustee or trustees 
for the distribution of the maximum amount to the grantoi For purposes of the prev IOUS 
sentence the term giantoi' means the individual referred to in paiagiaph (2) 
(2) For purposes of the subsection, a Medicaid qualifying trust1 is a trust or similar legal 
de\ ice established (other than by w ill) by an individual (or an individual s spouse) under 
w Inch the individual may be the beneficiary of all or part of the payments lrom the trust 
and the distubution of such payments is determined by one or more trustees who are 
permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution to the individual 
(3) This subsection shall apply without regard to 
(A) whether or not the Medicaid qualifying trust is irrevocable or is established 
foi purposes other than to enable a grantor to qualify for medical assistance under 
this title or 
(B) whether or not the discretion described in paragraph (2) is actually exercised 
(4) I he State may w an c 'he application of this subsection w ith respect to an mdiv idual 
wheic the State determines that such application would work an undue hardship 
The Medicaid agency determined that the Atticus Family Tiust satisfied all of the elements of 
a Medicaid qualifying trust (MQT) as descubed above and determined that the trust asset (the 
piopertv) was available to the petitioner, and countable towards the Medicaid asset limit 
The petitionees legal representative, Mr Robbins, stated that the piopert> held within the trust 
was in vocably gifted to the peti t ioners two children (Rene Pace and Robeit Perez) and hei 
niece and nephew (Jean Juoudek and Tom Juoudek) in September 1992 As such, Mr Robbins 
argued that the tiust piovisions prohibit "taking back the gift" and that the only value left to the 
petitioner is a ' valueless lifetime use nght " Theiefore theie aie no payments that can be 
permitted foi the benefit of the petitioner and the " sole 1 rust asset, undeveloped land, is not 
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an available asset " 
Medicaid law states that a trust must be considered an available asset il the trust meets the 
conditions of an MQT Thei c are three essential elements necessary for an MQT first, the trust 
must be established by the individual, second, the individual must be the beneficiary of all or 
pait of the payments from the trust, and third, the distribution of such payments is determined 
by one or more trustees who arc permitted to exercise any discretion regarding distribution to 
the individual 
I he trust mint be established by (he indnidual The trust begins by stating, 'This TRUST 
AGREEMENT is entered into by and between JANET PACE PEREZ (referred to as the 
'Trustor"), and JANET PACE PEREZ and ROBERTA JEAN FLOURNOY or then 
SUCLCSSOIS, as Trustee (icfeired to ds 'v^rustee , ,) " Article I, Creation of Trust, continues, ' By 
this agreement Tiustoi transfeis and delivers to the Trustee the property descrrbed in the 
attached Schedule A The property so described shall constitute the "trust estate," and shall 
be held IN TRUST and administered and distributed as provided below The Trust shall be 
irrevocable " 
Clearly the trust document shows that the trust was established by the petitioner Tom Jnoudek 
took exception to this interpretation stating that his mother, Robena Flournoy, was alsoatiustoi 
in that the piopeity v\as originally bought and paid for by both Roberta and the petitioner 
together However, there was no evidence presented which would suppoit Tom's position and 
the actual evidence is coniiadictoiy to the assertion Not only is the petitionei the sole trustor 
identified within the tiust document, the September 15, 1992, Quit-Claim deed lists only Janet 
Pace Perez as the grantor who transferred the property to the trust (to be managed by the 
or lginal trustees, Janet and Roberta) As the petitioner was the sole legal owner of the property 
with the power to transfer the property into the trust, it must be concluded that the petitioner 
established the trust with hei own property as the only trust asset 
The indnidual may be the benefiacuy of all oi pan oj the payments from the trust Rene Pace 
consistently aigued that her mother was not a beneficiary of the trust Rather, only she, hei 
brother and two cousins were benefrcianes A complete leading of the trust document appears 
to support the contention that, generally, the term "beneficiaries" applies to Rene, Robert, Tom 
and Jean However, the controlling clause of the Medicaid statute, " under which the 
individual maybe the beneficiary ol all or paitot the payments , ,1gocs beyond a simple listing 
of * beneiiciancs , , ! Utah law found in the Utah Code 7S-7-103, Definitions, defines 
"'Beneficiary' means a person that (i) has a piesent oi futuie beneficial intcicst in a tiust, 
vested oi contingent " 
As such, a beneficiary is identified as any peison who docs oi can benefit from the tiust and not 
merely il a peison is specifically mentioned (or not) as a beneficialy in willing 
1
 In laci there are no clauses within the trust document which specifically lists and identifies 'beneficiaries ' 
by name 
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It is clear that the petitioner benefits from the trust property Article IV(A)(2) states in part 
Trustees Janet Pace Perez shall be entitled to use and enjoyment of the piopeity for then 
lifetimes Aiticle IV(A)(7) states in pait 'The Iiustmay use the "common" land for purposes 
of generating income " Aiticle IVCQ states in part "Notwithstanding the rcquiiements stated 
above Trustor shall have the powei to altei the teims of the use or disposition of the property 
duung hei lifetime, provided that she may not pledge the property for the benefit of hei 
individual ci editors, or change anv homesite of the beneficiaries Othei than the homesite, the 
Trustor reserves the right to change the beneficial interest ds she may wish " Article V (A) 
states in patt 'Trustee may also retain funds in tiust for an> purpose sufficient to Trustee 
Aiticle V(B) states "If Tiustor or any Beneficialy shall come undei any physical or mental 
disability, in addition to the net income of the Trustors separate estate the 1 iustee may pay to 
01 appl) (01 the benefit of Trustor so much of" the principal of the disabled Irustoi s separate 
estate as the Tiustee shall deem necessaiv foi the Trustor s propei support, health, and 
maintenance to be paid out of all beneficial ics' shares, as the case ma> be, provided that no 
payment shall be made where other means of support are available, including insurance or 
public assistance " Article IX(F) states in pait "During the lifetime of 1 rustor, the Trustor shall 
have the power to direct the Trustee in writing, from time to time to retain, sell, exchange, 01 
lease an> property ol the tiust estate on specified terms and conditions, and to invest funds of 
the trust estate that Tiustor specifies " Article XI(P) states in pertinent pait "This Trust may 
be amended only in wnting b\ Trustor during her lifetime, provided that she may not amend to 
the benefit of any creditor of hers 
Thus the petitioner has a piesent benefit in the use and enjoyment of the trust property (except 
(01 two acres given as gifts) during hei lifetime The petitioner retains the right to control the 
property held within the trust and can arrange foi income generating schemes on the' common ' 
land (potential future benefit), to sell, exchange, or lease the property (present and future 
benefit) The petitioner has the ability to alter the terms of use or disposition of the property 
within the tiust (potential futuie benefit) The petitioner, now acknowledged as disabled, has 
the piesent right to the net income and principal fiom the trust The pi esiding officer deter mines 
that the petitioner holds significant beneficial interest (both piesent and futuie) in the tiust and 
that she is indeed a beneficiary of the payments from the trust 
The disti ibution of such pa\ments is determined IA one oi moie trustees who ate permuted to 
exercise an) discretion with respect to the distribution 
Originally the petitioner and her sister, Roberta Flour noy, were the I rsted trustees Their tiustee 
duties ha\e now been taken ovci by Robeit Peiezand Tom Jnoudek as Roberta is deceased and 
the petitioner is incapacitated Despite who is acting as tiustec(s), dn\ tiustee has the legal 
responsibility to administer the trust according to the terms of the trust Although lorn Jnoudek 
testified that he (as a successor trustee) would not authorize any payments from the trust to the 
petitioner, he has a legal responsibility to do so and is explicitly lequircd to do so according to 
the terms of the tiust Aiticle Xl(K)(2)(c), Effect ol Detciinitiation ol Incapacity, states in 
pertinent part the Trustee shall have power and authority on such incapacitated Irustoi s or 
Trustee's behalf to exercise or perform any act, power, duty, right or obligation whatsoever that 
such Trustor or Trustee may have ... The power granted to the Trustee under (c) above shall be 
construed and interpreted as a general durable powei of attorney to act as such Trustor's 
attorney in fact and agent in his name and for his benefit and shall be in addition to all other 
powers bestowed upon the Trustee by this agreement." Thus, the successor trustees now hold 
the authority to take any and all actions originally granted to the petitioner as Trustor and 
original Trustee of the trust. As explained, this includes the discretion to sell, exchange or lease 
the property, to alter the terms of the use or disposition of the property and to change the 
beneficial interests of the trust Most importantly, the trustee(s) have the discretion to distribute 
income and principal as contained in Article V(B). "If Trustor or any Beneficiary shall come 
under any physical or mental disability, in addition to the net income of the Trustor's separate 
estate, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of Trustor so much of the principal of the 
disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall deem necessary for the Trustor's proper 
support, health, and maintenance, to be paid out of all beneficiaries shares, as the case may be, 
provided that no payment shall be made where other means of support are available, including 
insurance, or public assistance." It is determined here that the trustee(s) are permitted to 
exercise full discretion with respect to the distribution of potential trust payments. 
It is the conclusion here that the trust meets all requirements of a Medicaid qualifying trust. The 
trust was established by the petitioner, the petitioner is a beneficiary of ail or part of the 
payments from the trust, and the distribution of such payments is determined by one or more 
trustees who are permitted to exercise any discretion with respect to the distribution to the 
petitioner. 
Having determined that the trust is an MQT and therefore countable as an asset for Medicaid 
eligibility, it is necessary to address other arguments presented at the hearing which primarily 
address the value of the property held in trust. 
There v\ as much discussion concerning Article V(B), particularly the wording "separate estate." 
Mr. Robbins argued that the entire trust estate was "gifted" to the petitioner's children and niece 
and nephew. As such, the only "separate estate" available to the petitioner (and the other 
original trustee, Roberta Flournoy) was her specific right of the "use and enjoyment of the 
property for their lifetimes" (Article IV(A)(2)). Further, he stated that there was not a value or 
market which could be placed on the petitioner's exclusive "use" right and thus there was no 
countable Medicaid asset. 
Contrary to the determination that the entire trust estate was "gifted" to the petitioner's children 
and niece and nephew upon establishment of the trust, the presiding officer finds that only 
specific !/2-acie lots were "gifted" leaving the remaining 48 acres "ungifted" and comprising the 
petitioner's "separate estate." Article IV(A), Creation of Beneficial Interests, clearly states in 
pertinent parts: "Trustor hereby irrevocably gifts beneficial ownership in the Trust to her 
children ... and her niece and nephew ... as follows (emphasis added): (1) Trustor declares that 
she reserves to her children and niece and nephew named above for their exclusive use, a 
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minimum of Vidcit each out of a total 50 acre parcel of property on a fust come, first sei ve1 
basis to be used as a homesite for each beneficiary foi such beneficiary's use (2) Trustees 
Janet Pace Peiez and/or Roberta Jean Floumoy shall be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the 
ptopert) foi their lifetimes with limited use leserved to the beneficiaries provided that it does 
not conflict with the use by Janet Pace Perez and/or Roberta Jean Flournoy (6) Without the 
concurrence of the Trustees and other beneficiaries no beneficiary shall be entitled to sell or 
otherwise dispose of encumber or mortgage his or her interest in the property or the Vi acre 
homesite (7) The Trust may use the 'common' land for putposes of generating income (8) 
No beneficiary can be forced to move fiom the piopeity once their homesite is established " 
It is not until the death of the petitioner that hei childien and niece and nephew are entitled to 
ownership of any propeit) beyond their previously selected Vi acie sites as stated in Article VI 
Disposition on Death of Tiustoi 'Upon the death of the Trustor, the Tiustee shall maisha! the 
assets of the trust estate and do the follow ing (1) Divide the Estate in four (4) equal shai es 
of beneficial interest to the children of the Trustor and the niece and nephew of Trustor (2) 
The surviving Co Trustees may thereafter liquidate and distribute the Trust to the beneficiaries 
If not so liquidated (partially or lull>) the property shall continue to be held in trust " 
It is concluded here that the entue trust estate (50 acres) was not "gifted' to the petitioner s 
children and niece and nephew, rather, only potential Vz acre homesites were irrevocably 
gifted ' The 48 acres of lungifted' piopeity remain the petitioner's "separate estate " Article 
V allows for disbursements from the net income and principal of the "separate estate for the 
cate ot the petitionei once she is under physical 01 mental disability 
Mr Robbins aigued that there were unique factois with the piopeity which must be considered 
when determining a value for the property He stated that two-thirds of the property is creek 
gully and that the canyon wall is crumbling Eaiher in the >ear, a deadly accident occurred 
along the same strip when the canvon wall collapsed and killed a young boy Mr Robbins 
stated that the descnption of the pioperty in the tiust wains in Article IV(A)(4) that, "In the 
event of eiosion of a beneficial) 's i/i-acie choice of land, icndenng the land unsuitable for a 
homesite, said portion can be extended 
Robert Perez testified that the Kan ib area is "fauly depressed" concerning land values and that 
piopertv is not selling 
Rene Pace testified that at one point her cousin Jean listed the property for sale over the internet 
for $45 000 00 but theie weie no senous offers 
The Medicaid agency detei mined that the \ alue of the property (SO acres) w as $82,219 00 based 
on a 2003 Kane County Notice of property Valuation and Tax Changes document Robert Peiez 
testified that he has taken the lesponsibility to pay the piopeity taxes foi the last couple of >cais 
but no family mem be 1 has challenged the assessed value and tax Greater weight is gi\cn here 
to the county \aluation It is reasonable to conclude that if the property were of much less value 
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than the official valuation, the family would have taken steps for a reassessment. Therefore, the 
presiding officer values the 48 acres of available property at $78,930.24. 
The petitioner's representative and family also presented testimony regarding the intent of the 
petitioner in creating the trust (to provide lta safe haven or refuge for family members which 
would remain unencumbered and beyond the reach of any creditors"). However, the Medicaid 
statute at paragraph 3 of section 1902(k) explicitly states that the MQT rules will apply "without 
regard to whether or not the medicaid qualifying trust is irrevocable or is established for 
purposes other than to enable a grantor to qualify for medical assistance under this title." This 
case is illustrative of conclusions reached by the United States Congress when explaining the 
purpose of the MQT law: 
Our conclusion reflects the legislative concern that the Medicaid program not be used as 
an estate planning tool. The Medicaid program would be at fiscal risk if individuals were 
permitted to preserve assets for their heirs while receiving Medicaid benefits from the 
state. Congress enacted the Medicaid qualifying trust provision as an addition to the 
provisions designed to assure that individuals receiving nursing home and other long-term 
care services under Medicaid are in fact poor and have not transferred assets that should 
be used to purchase the needed services before Medicaid benefits are made available. (H. 
Rep. No. 99-265, 99,h Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1985)). 
It is the decision here that the trust is an MQT (and therefore countable as a Medicaid asset) and 
that the trust asset is valued at $78, 930.24 which is the maximum amount (net income plus 
principal) which can be distributed to the petitioner assuming the full exercise of discretion by 
the current trustees. 
Finally, arguments pertaining to the "undue hardship" clause of section 1902(k)(4) were heard 
at the hearing. The Utah Medicaid policy concerning undue hardship is found in The Utah 
Medical Manual, Vol.IIIM Sec.5 11-8 and reads in pertinent parts: 
(7) The assets of a trust can be excluded from countable assets when there would be an 
undue hardship on the client if the tiust assets were counted. An undue hardship exists 
if both of the following conditions are met: 
A. The client has exhausted all reasonable legal means to gain access to 
the trust which can include petitioning a court or trustee to allow access 
to trust funds. It is not reasonable to require the client to take action if a 
knowledgeable source (such as the client's lawyer or financial institution) 
confirms that it is doubtful those efforts will succeed. That 
knowledgeable source must explain the reason for the decision ... It is not 
reasonable to require the client to take action more costly than the value 
of the asset. 
B. Without Medicaid coverage for institutional ... care, the client will not 
be able to get the medical care needed AND the client is at risk of death 
or permanent disability without that care. This must be verified by a 
physician's statement. Additionally, the client must verify that the client 
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and the client s spouse or parents(s) cannot aflord to meet the client s 
medical needs at home 
The Medicaid agency evaluated undue hardship based on documentation provided by the 
petitioner s family The agency determined that undue hardship did not exist in this instance 
stating "Information we have received does not indicate all legal means to make the trust 
available have been exhausted Requirement A of the requirement for undue hardship has not 
been met Pertaining to Condition B, the client is receiving the caie needed There is a 
question as to whether pharmacy is being met but no conclusive evidence that prescriptions are 
not being provided by the Kane County Hospital Conditions A and B must be met for undue 
hardship to be granted Since the) have not been met the request for Undue Hardship is 
denied 
The documentation provided by the petitioner s famil) in then support for an undue hardship 
exemption included two statements from Dr Bowman attesting to the fact that the petitioner is 
complete!) dependent on skilled nursing care tor her daily needs/ ' and that, "Our hospital 
has been pioviding her medicatrons for the past five months and has had to write off these 
expenses " Rene Pace presented a statement to the agency voicing her understanding that she 
felt all reasonable legal means to make the trust asset available to her mother had been 
exhausted Vis Pace also stated that neither she nor her brother Robeit would be able to 
properl) care for their mother outside of the caie center Also presented foi undue hardship 
consideration was a statement by Stephen Howclls, Chief Financial Officei of the Kane County 
Hospital, stating that in his opinion, the petitioner was not a beneficiary of the trust because 
there was no "method in the trust for those funds to be accessed for Mrs Perez' care " Mr 
Robbins had provided the family with a statement dated March 21, 2005, wherein he expressed 
his legal opinion that the tiust asset was not available to the petitioner because she is not a 
beneficiary of the trust asset and, "In fact, she is expressly forbidden to pledge any asset of the 
Trust for the benefit of hei creditois It strikes me as somewhat anomalous that the property is 
being uiged as a disqualifying asset even though Mrs Perez is expressly denied the right to use 
the piopetty to pay an) of her debts or obligations' ' Mr Robbins also opined that he is familiar 
with the propeity and that the value of the piopeity was much reduced due to the expmding 
creek bed, eroding can) on walls, sandy soil, sinkholes, and general narrow confines of the land 
He concluded that, " in any kind of forced sale situation, the propeity would realize only a 
nominal value " 
The presiding officer finds no undue hardship at this time because the fust criterion (that all 
reasonable legal means to gain access to the trust have been exhausted) is not met MQT law 
dictates that the trust asset is available to the petitioner If the trustees refuse to disburse the 
asset to the petitioner they would not only be failing in their fiduciary capacity but the petitioner 
would be required, at a minimum, to petition a couit to allow disbuisement bcfoic a hardship 
determination could be rendered Although it is understood that the pctrtionei suffers from 
severe medical impaiimcntsandicquiies long teim caie, theicis no legal basis to determine that 
her medical needs cannot be covered by the trust asset A hardship waiver cannot be granted 
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RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
The decision by the Medicaid agency to deny the petitioner's application because the asset held 
within the trust is available and countable is hereby AFFIRMED. No further agency action is 
necessary. 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision and 
a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of that review, will be released 
simultaneously by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. 
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ATTICUS FAMILY TRUST 
This TRUST AGREEMENT is entered into by and between 
JANET PACE PEREZ (referred to as the "Trustor") r and JANET 
PACE PEREZ and ROBERTA JEAN FLOURNOY, or their successors, as 
Trustee (referred to as "Trustee"). 
ARTICLE I 
CREATION OF TRUST 
By this agreement, Trustor transfers and delivers to the 
Trustee, "the property described in the attached Schedule A, 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the Trustee. 
The property so described, together with any other property 
that may become subject to this trust shall constitute the 
"trust estate," and shall be held IN TRUST and administered 
and distributed as provided below. This trust shall be known 
as the "ATTICUS FAMILY TRUST." The Trust shall be 
irrevocable, 
ARTICLE II 
STATEMENT REGARDING FAMILY 
Trustor declares that her only children are the 
following: RENEf ELIZABETH PACE TULAK and ROBERT THOMAS 
PEREZ. 
to ARTICLE III CONTROL BY INITIAL TRUSTEES 
S^T At all times that JANET PACE PEREZ shall be the Trustee, 
she shall administer the Trust with her Co-Trustee without 
requirement to consult,the beneficiaries* After said 
C A L L U N & W E S T F A L L 
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Co-Trustees cease to serve as Trustee(s), the Successor 
Trustees shall control the trust, provided that the major 
decisions to sell, subdivide or encumber the property shall 
be concurred in by a majority of a quorum of beneficiaries. 
Such concurrence of a majority of a quorum of beneficiaries 
shall not apply in the case of the Trust being administered 
by the initial Trustees, or the survivor of them. A quorum 
shall consist of three (3) beneficiaries• A majority of a 
quorum of lines shall be represented at a meeting held for 
this purpose, with notice sent to the last known address of a 
beneficiary. A meeting may be held by telephone conference 
if so specified in the notice; notice to be given at least 
five (5) days in writing prior to the meeting. Vote by 
written proxy shall be allowed* There shall be one vote for 
each of the four (4) beneficiary lines. If any vote for a 
beneficiary line shall be represented by more than one 
beneficiaryf the majority of that line shall control. If any 
beneficiaries are minors, their vote shall be controlled by 
the Trustees. 
ARTICLE IV 
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY 
AND OPERATION OF TRUST 
A. CREATION OF BENEFICIAL INTERESTS 
At the inception of the Trust, the Trust Property 
shall be that certain property located in the State of Utah 
set forth at Schedule A. Trustor hereby irrevocably gifts 
bene£jL^^ in the Trust to her children, 
RENE'ELIZABETH PACE TULAK and ROBERT THOMAS PEREZ, and her 
niece and nephew, JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK, aka JEAN V* 
FLOURNOY and THOMAS RONALD JIROUDEK, as follows: 
1} Trustor declares that she reserves to her children 
and niece and nephew named above for their exclusive use, a 
minimum of 1/2 acre each out of a total 50-acre parcel of 
property described at Exhibit A hereto, on a "first come, 
first serve" basis, to be used as a homesite for each 
C VLLFAX & \ \ ' i : S T F A L L 
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beneficiary, for such beneficiary's use (*io^  beneficial 
interest is intended to be given to any other person, 
although the beneficiaries may allow their family, guests or 
invitees to use the property for living purposes with the 
express written consent of the Trustees) . 
2) Trustees, JANET PACE PEREZ and/or ROBERTA JEAN 
FLOURNOY shall be er^ i .t^ j^ d to use and enjoyment of the 
property for their /lifetimes^) including specific use of the 
existing R.V. trailer~wK1Tch has been set up on the property 
complete with utility hookups, with limited use reserved to 
the beneficiaries provided that it does not conflict with the 
use by JANET PACE PEREZ and/or ROBERTA JEAN FLOURNOY. 
3) JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK (a/k/a Jean V. Flournoy) , is 
the only one who has selected her approximately one-half 
(1/2) acre homesite and presently resides on the land because 
yshe volunteered to be the resident caretaker to protect the 
property from vandals and other concerns. Therefore, JEAN 
VIRGINIA JIROUDEK is guaranteed the parcel she has chosen, as 
follows : 
Beginning at the West Quarter Corner of Section 4, 
Township 44 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North to fifty (50) 
feet, more or less. South of the (power, water and 
sewer) RV Hookup, along the Section Line; thence 
East to the West Rim of the Canyon? thence South 
along the West Canyon Rim to directly East of the 
BLM Quarter Corner Marker; thence West to the point 
of beginning. 
If this description does not equal at least 1/2 acre of solid 
topland, the description is to be changed to extend South of 
the Quarter Corner Marker until it does* 
It is to be noted here that the improvements and 
structures on this specific portion of the land belong to 
JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK and are not a part of the Trust, as 
she paid for them with her own personal money. 
Since the utilities that run from Navajo Drive to JEAN 
VIRGINIA JIROUDEK1s homesite were partially paid for by JANET 
PACE PEREZ, and the City of Kanab has allowed for only one 
water meter at this time, it is to be understood that the 
j>r 
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utilities are to be shared (if possible) by the other 
beneficiaries until and if provision can be made for separate 
utilities and water meter(s) . While the utilities are 
shared, the parties shall work out payment for usage among 
themselves unless the Trustee shall notify the affected 
parties that there is enough money in a trust account to pay 
for them. 
4) In the event of erosion of a beneficiary's 
1/2-acre choice of land, rendering the land unsuitable for a 
homesite, said portion can be extended, provided only that 
said extended portion does not encroach on another 
beneficiary's homesite selection, or a different site can be 
selected. 
5} An easement shall be provided for ingress and 
egress to all other homesites, after all four (4) 
beneficiaries have designated their 1/2-acre choice of land, 
6) Without the concurrence of the Trustees and 
other beneficiaries, no beneficiary shall be entitled to sell 
or otherwise dispose of, encumber or mortgage his or her 
interest i^T^the property or the 1/2-acre homesite. 
/ ly The Trust may use the "common" land for 
purposes/ of generating income, provided that: 
a) The Trustees and a majority of 
beneficiaries agree to such project as per ARTICLE III; 
b) The project does not displace, infringe 
upon, block access to, or otherwise invade or devalue the 
personal homesite of any of the beneficiaries; 
c) The project generates income to support: 
i) Expenses of project/venture 
ii) Expenses of maintenance of property 
(i.e. property taxes, insurance, assessments, trust expenses, 
etc.) 
iii) Expenses and support of beneficiaries 
directly involved in project/venture. 
iv) Confotms to local, state and federal 
ordinances and laws. 
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v) Does not destroy the land, or cause it 
to lose value through abuse or neglect. 
vi) Does not create undue or unjust 
financial hardship on any of the beneficiaries. ^Si^^^^J 
8) No beneficiary can be forced to move from the 
property once their homesite is established unless it is 








No Beneficiary may add to the Trust* Initial 
Trustees may add property to the Trust but any such addition 
may be accounted separately if required by the document 
conveying any such assets. 
C. CONTROL OF TRUSTOR 
Notwithstanding the requirements stated above, 
Trustor shall have the power to alter the terms of the use or 
disposition of the property during her lifetime, provided 
that she may not pledge the property for the benefit of her 
individual creditors, or change any homesite of the 
beneficiaries after a homesite is selected and the 
beneficiary has made material improvements to the homesite. 
Until then, the Trustor may modify the beneficial interests 
regarding the homesite* Other thaiL the_horaesite, the Trustor-
reserves the right to chaj 
ARTICLE V 
DISPOSITION OF TRUST ESTATE DURING 
LIFETIME OF TRUSTOR 
A. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND PRINCIPAL 
During the lifetime of the Trustor, the Trustee 
may pay to the benef iciaries, in the discretion of the 
Trustee, the up-to-the net income of the Trust Estate, (if 
any) quarter-annually or in more frequent installments. 
.LLIAN A V f S T F A l X 
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Trustee may also retain funds in trust for any purpose 
sufficient to Trustee. 
B
- INVASION OF PRINCIPAL BY TRUSTEE 
If Trustor or any Beneficiary shall come under any 
physical or mental disability, in addition to^the net income 
of the Trustorf s separate estate
 f the Trustee may pay to or 
apply for the benefit of Trustor so much of the principal of 
the disabled Trustor's separate estate as the Trustee shall 
deem necessary for the Trustor? s^rop~erTr6uppor^^ 
r^ainFenanceTVAbrcbe^paid. jput:of allij&RSneficiaTfTes^r sbare'sT^ -as"*i 
:theT:caseTm^^^ payment" shall^be^m^de^he'Fe 7vV 
other- means -of -support -are -available , :anc^l_ud^^j£^^ 
public <assx.sjtance.sr b& < ^ f (sfyAtO 
ARTICLE VI 
DISPOSITION ON DEATH OF TRUSTOR 
Upon the death of the Trustor, the Trustee shall 
marshall the assets of the trust estate, including any assets 
that devolve to the Trust by the testamentary disposition and 
do the following: 
1) Divide the Estate in four (4) equal shares of 
beneficial interest to the children of the Trustor, 
RENE1 ELIZABETH PACE TULAK and ROBERT THOMAS PEREZ, and the 
niece and nephew of Trustor, JEAN VIRGINIA JIROUDEK and 
THOMAS RONALD JIROUDEK. If any of the four (4) named 
beneficiaries shall predecease the Trustor, that deceased 
beneficiary's share shall be held in Trust by the Trustee for 
the benefit of that person's living children, distributed in 
the same manner as ARTICLE VIII, with respect to children. 
The final discretion of the Trustee shall control. 
) 2) The surviving Co-Trustees may thereafter 
^liquidate and distribute the Trust to the beneficiaries upon 
the affirmative vote of three of the four Co-Trustees (if 
there are 4); two of three (if there are three); two of two 
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(if there a^e two), or at the discretion of the Trustee, if 
-there is on£ (1) Trustee. If not so liquidated (partially or 
fully) the property shall continue to be held in tr^st with 
the property administered for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries. Notwithstanding the above, the Trustees may 
not liquidate the 1/2 acre homesite and access and utility of 
any beneficiary who is living on the project without that 
beneficiary's express written consent. 
ARTICLE VII 
DISPOSITION OF CHILDREN'S SHARES 
Upon the death of any beneficiary, his or h£*" share 
shall be given to that person's living children, a^d if no 
living chil^^en, then to the surviving beneficiaries of 
Trustor, or their children if they shall not survive. In the 
event that any beneficial interest shall be payable to a 
minor, the trustee(s) shall have the obligation to apply the 
income from the Trust allocated to this interest to the 
benefit of £he minor, provided that principal may be invaded 
if necessary to pay education, general welfare< o? health 
needs, as cJetenuined by the Trustee (s) , provided that no 
payments shall be made if insurance payments ot public 
assistance . ^re otherwise available. If liquidation of the 
Trust is elected and any beneficiary shall be a minor, it 
shall be paid to their parent Cs) having custody or the Legal 
guardian, for the benefit of the child, provided that no 
payment shall be made to JERRY THOMAS TULAK or his relatives 
(except the beneficiaries) and in this event, the Trustees 
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this instrument and subject to any limitations stated 
elsewhere in this instrument, the Trustee is vested with the 
following powers with respect to the trust estate and any 
part of it, in addition to those powers now or hereafter 
conferred by law: 
A. STATUTORY POWERS 
All powers enumerated in the Utah Probate Code as 
it exists on the date of this instrument, as though such 
powers were herein set forth in full, without necessity for 
petition to the court having jurisdiction over this Trust* 
B
- POWER TO RETAIN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS IN TRUST 
To continue to hold any property, including shares 
of the stock of any Trustee under this instrument, and to 
operate at the risk of the trust estate any business received 
or acquired under the trust by the Trustee as long as the 
Trustee shall deem advisable; provided, however, that except 
as to a residence or other property held for the personal use 
of the Trustor, unproductive or underproductive property 
shall not be held as an asset of the trusts established 
hereunder for more than a reasonable time during the lifetime 
of the Trustor without such Trustor's written consent. 
C. POWER OF SALE, EXCHANGE AND REPAIR 
To manage, control, grant options on, sell (for 
cash or on deferred payments), convey, exchange, partition, 
divide, improve and repair trust property, 
D. POWER TO INSURE 
To carry, at the expense of the trust, insurance of 
such kinds and in such amounts as the Trustee shall deem 
advisable to protect the trust estate and Trustee against any 
hazard. 
E. POWER TO COMMENCE OR DEFEND LITIGATION 
To commence or defend litigation with respect to 
the trust or any property of the trust estate as the Trustee 
may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust. 
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F. INVESTMENT POWERS 
To invest and reinvest all or any part of the trust 
estate in such common or preferred stock, shares of 
investment trusts, and investment companies, bonds t municipal 
bonds or other obligations of political subdivisions, 
debentures, mortgages, deeds of trust, notes, real estate, or 
other property as the Trustee in the Trustee's absolute 
discretion may select, including any common trust fund 
administered by any Trustee under this instrument, and the 
Trustee may continue to hold in the form in which received 
(or the form to which changed by reorganization, stock split, 
stock dividend, or other like occurrence) any securities or 
other property the Trustee may acquire at any time under this 
trust, it being Trustor's express desire and intention that 
the Trustee shall have full power to invest and reinvest the 
trust funds without being restricted to and forms of 
investment that the Trustee otherwise may be permitted to 
make by law; and the investments need not be diversified. 
G. DETERMINATION OF PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AND OWNERSHIP 
Ownership of the Trust Estate shall be determined 
by percentage of ownership that the beneficial interest 
account shall bear to the total (initially determined by the 
fair market value of the property) • All cash expense of the 
Trust shall be paid out of Trustor's sharer until her death, 
after which all expenses of the Trust (except last expenses 
and taxes of Trustor) shall be shared and allocated according 
to beneficial interest. All income, losses and depreciation 
shall be shared according to beneficial interest* Generally 
accepted accounting principles shall be used, subject to the 
direction above, 
H, DECISIONS AFFECTING TAXES 
If no Personal Representative of the Trustor's 
estate is appointed following a Trustor's death, the Trustee 
acting under this instrument shall, in determining federal 
estate and income tax liabilities, have discretion to select 
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the valuation date, to determine whether any or all of the 
allowable expenses shall be used as federal estate tax 
deductions or as federal income tax deductions (with like 
discretion as to any applicable state taxes) , to select the 
redemption date of any United States obligations that are 
eligible for redemption at par in payment of taxes, to make all 
other elections, and to take all other appropriate actions 
with respect to taxation of Trustor or the trust estate, 
I, ADJUSTMENT TO COMPENSATE FOR TAX DECISIONS 
Except as otherwise provided in this instrument/ 
the Trustee shall have absolute discretion, but shall not be 
required, to make adjustments in the rights of any 
beneficiaries or among the principal and income accounts, to 
compensate for the consequences of any tax decision or 
election that the Trustee believes has had the effect, 
directly or indirectly, of preferring one beneficiary or 
group of beneficiaries over another. 
J, DEALINGS WITH PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
The Trustee, in the Trustee's discretion, may make 
loans at the prevailing rates of interest to the Personal 
Representative of the Trustor's estate on such terms and 
conditions that the Trustee shall determine, and may purchase 
at the fair market value thereof, and retain as assets of the 
trust, any real and personal property held in the Trustor's 
estate. 
K. RIGHT TO RENOUNCE 
If no Personal Representative of a Trustor's estate 
is appointed following a Trustor's death, the Trustee is 
authorized (except to the extent fundamentally inconsistent 
with the provisions of this instrument and the Trustor's 
estate plan) to renounce, in whole or in part, any devise or 
legacy or any interest in any trust for a Trustor's benefit 
(including a trust created under this instrument), at any 
time within nine (9) months after the date of the transfer 
which created the interest in the Trustor* 
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ARTICLE IX 
PROVISIONS RESPECTING TRUSTEE 
A. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE 
In case either Trustee resigns or is unable to act 
for any reason, "the following shall act as Successor Trustee, 
in the ordernamed: 
1. ^  The survivor of the initial Trustees. 
^2jJ? ROBERT THOMAS PEREZ and THOMAS RONALD JIROUDEK, 
as Co-Tr^tees , with a majority of beneficiaries as set forth 
in ARTICLE III. 
3* All four (4) beneficiaries acting as 
Co-Trustees. 
The decision of a majority of Co-Trustees shall controlf 
except as otherwise provided. If there shall be only two (2) 
Trustees, both must agree• 
B. WAIVER OF BOND 
No bond shall be required of any Trustee named in 
this instrument. 
C. LIMITATION UPON INDIVIDUAL TRUSTEE 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
instrument to the contrary, no person acting as Trustee 
hereunder shall participate as Trustee in the exercise of any 
Trustee's power or discretion which would have the effect of 
discharging any of such person's legal obligations or which 
is exercisable in favor of such person, his estate, his 
creditors or the creditors of his estate, including (but 
without limitation thereto) any power or discretion of the 
Trustee to invade principal for the benefit of such person; 
and any such power or discretion shall reside solely in the 
disinterested Trustee. This limitation on such person shall 
apply only to any power or discretion exercisable by him as 
Trustee and shall not apply to any power or discretion herein 
conferred upon such person solely in his individual capacity. 
In addition, no individual Trustee shall possess 
or exercise any incidents of ownership over any life 
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insurance policies on such Trustee's life that are included 
in the trust estate, and the possession of and power to 
exercise such incidents of ownership shall reside solely in 
the disinterested Trustee• 
D. NO COMPENSATION TO TRUSTEE 
The Trustee shall not be entitled to compensation 
for his or her services, but shall be compensated for the 
services of counsel retained by him or her, and other 
out-of-pocket expenses, including services in connection vith 
the termination in whole or in part of any trust hereunder. 
E. AUTHORITY OF TRUSTOR TO TRANSFER 
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST 
At any time and front time to time the TrjJusi^ LT^ sh^ ll 
have full power to change the situs of any trust created 
property constituting the trust estate, or any part of the 
property, to any other state in these United States in which 
she may then be domiciled and to employ whatever assistants 
are necessary for this purpose* If the Trustor should become 
a nonresident of Utah while she is a Trustee hereunder, she 
shall retain the power to administer any trust property 
remaining in Utah and such removal from such state shall not 
be ground for removal of her as Trustee of any trust 
hereunder. Such power to transfer the situs of any trust 
hereunder for purposes of administration or to remove any 
property constituting the trust estate shall not be denied to 
the Trustor on the ground that any Trustee hereunder is 
unable or unwilling to continue as the Trustee after such 
transfer or removal, and in such case the provisions above 
prescribed for the appointment of a successor Trustee shall 
govern as applicable. 
F. INVESTMENT POWER SOLELY IN TRUSTOR 
During the lifetime of Trustor, the Trustor shall 
have the power to direct the Trustee in writing, from 
time to time, to retain, sell, exchange, or lease any 
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property of the trust estate on specified terms and 
conditions/ and to invest funds of the trust estate that 
Trustor specifies. The Trustee shall comply with all such 
written directions, shall have no responsibility to review 
trust investments, and shall incur no liability to any 
beneficiary of the trust or to any other person for following 
such written direction received by it from Trustor, or for 
failure to act in the absence of such written direction. 
ARTICLE X ^P 
NO CONTEST *** 
In the event any beneficiary under this trust shall, 
singularly or in conjunction with any other person or 
persons, contest in any court the validity of this trust or 
of Trustor's Last Will or shall seek to obtain an 
adjudication in any proceeding in any court that this trust 
or any of its provisions or that such Will or any of its 
provisions is void, or seek otherwise to void, nullify, or 
set aside this trust or any of its provisions, then the right 
of that person to take any interest given to him by this 
trust shall be determined as it would have been determined 
had the person predeceased the execution of this trust 
instrument without surviving issue. 
The Trustee is hereby authorized to defend, at the 
expense of the trust estate, any contest or other attack of 
any nature on this trust or any of its provisions. ;> 
\' ^ U 
ARTICLE XI x> y ^
 <A- ^ > , 
GENERAL TRUST PROVISIONS \^ *^ ^ J\ 
A. SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION 
Mo interest in the principal or income of any trust 
created under this instrument shall be anticipated, assigned, 
or encumbered or subject to any creditor's claim or to legal 
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process
 f prior to its actual receipt by the beneficiary. 
B- MANNER OF MAKING PAYMENTS TO MINORS OR INCOMPETENTS 
The Trustee, in the Trustee's discretionr may make 
payments to a minor or other fe&jjp^i<?4*arywunder disability by 
making payments to his guardian, or to any suitable person 
with whom he resides, or to any qualified adult person or 
trus-t company as custodian for such minor under the Uniform 
Gifts to Minors Act as enacted by the state of such minor's 
residence, or the Trustee may apply payments directly for the 
bej^SiciaryJg^C benefit• The Trustee, in the Trustee's 
discretion, may make payments directly to a minor if, in the 
Trustee's judgment, he is of sufficient age and maturity to 
spend the money properly. 
C. NO PHYSICAL DIVISION OF TRUST PROPERTY REQUIRED 
There need be no physical segregation or division 
of the assets of the various separate trusts except as 
segregation or division may be required by the termination of 
any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate 
accounts therefore. The Trustee may merge the assets of any 
trust hereunder with those of any other trust maintained for 
the same beneficiaries upon substantially the same terms and 
having the same Trustee• 
D. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH 
In case any income beneficiary and any remainderman 
of any trust created hereunder die either simultaneously, or 
under such circumstances as to render it difficult or 
impossible to determine who predeceased the other, the income 
beneficiary shall be deemed to have survived the 
remai nderman. 
E. NOTICE OF EVENTS 
Until the Trustee receives written notice of any 
birth, death, marriage or other event upon which the right to 
receive payments from the trust estate may depend, the 
Trustee shall incur no liability for disbursements of 
principal or income made in good faith to any person whose 
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interest n*ay have been affected by that event, 
F# TERMINATION CLAUSE REQUIRED BY LAW 
Unless sooner terminated in accordance with other 
provisions of this instrument, each trust created under this 
instrument shall terminate twenty-one (21) years after the 
death of the last survivor of the Trustor and Trustor's issue 
who are living at the time of the predeceased Trustor's 
death, or living at such time as this trust might earlier 
become irrevocable. All principal and undistributed income 
of any trust so terminated shall be distributed to the then 
income beneficiaries of that trust in the proportions in 
which they are, at the . time of termination, entitled to 
receive the income; provided/ however, that if the rights to 
income are not then fixed by the terms of the trust, 
distribution under this clause shall be made, by 
representation, to such issue of Trustor as are then entitled 
or authorized in the Trustee's discretion to receive income 
payments, or, if there are no such issue of Trustor, in equal 
shares to those beneficiaries who are then entitled or 
authorized to receive income payments* 
G. *%?DISCRETIONARY TEBMINATIOtf B Y ~ T R U S T W 
. f e ^ , ^ — ~ "" ' 
If, at any time, in the judgment of the Trustee, the 
aggregate fair market value of any trust established 
hereunder shall be sufficiently small that its administration 
is no longer economically advisable, the cost of 
administration is disproportionate to the value of the 
assets, or the continuation of the trust is no longer in the 
best interest of the beneficiaries, the Trustee, in the 
Trustee's absolute discretion, may terminate such trust and 
distribute the then remaining balance thereof as in the 
previous subparagraph relating to a termination required by 
law. 
H. SEVERABILITY 
If any provision of t h i s instrument i s 
unenforceable , the remaining provisions sha l l nevertheless be 
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carried into effect. 
I. GENDER AND NUMBER 
As used in this instrument, the masculine, feminine 
or neuter gender, and the singular or plural number, include 
the other whenever the context so indicates. 
J
- PARAGRAPH HEADINGS 
The descriptive phrases at the head of various 
paragraphs as to their content are inserted only as a matter 
of convenience and reference, and in no way are intended to 
be part of this instrument or to define, limit or describe 
the scope or intent of the text of the particular paragraphs 
to which they refer. 
K. INCAPACITY 
1. Determination of I^caPaci^y^Aj£j^£^^,t ^ any ^ t^iioea 
the Trustee {or Successor^rjisteey--as^the -cais^n^ay^Se)iSsirall^ 
receive - a-written statement^sXghkdj^hyh kS^^^^B€orXsMJ>T 
Trustee^-V" personal ^ physVdlan^ (or a specialist approved by 
such personal physician, fr^'^any ~- two~v^bther -*- lic"erise<r 
physicians) ^ stating that he considers a Trustor or a Trustee 
to be so mentally or physically incapacitated as to be 
substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources 
and affairs effectively or^^lioT^Tesi^st^^f ra\id~^or^ undue 
^influence, and if the Trustee other than such incapacitated 
Trustor or Trustee shall concur in any such statement and 
shall file a similar statement in the records of the trust, 
then, whether or not such Trustor or Trustee may have been 
adjudicated or certified an incapacitated or incompetent 
person and notwithstanding any contrary direction from such 
Trustor or Trustee, such Trustor or Trustee shall be 
considered to be incapacitated; p*wraffdlSgJ^£^^ a 
control. « This paragraph "K" shall also apply to the 
determination of incapacity of any Successor Trustee. 
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2. %p c3E*a 
Trustor or Trustee is determined to be incapacitated as 
provided above, then, during the period of such incapacity, 
(a) if such Trustor or Trustee is then acting as a trustee 
hereunder, he shall be deemed to have resigned; (b) any 
attempt by such Trustor to exercise any of the powers 
reserved by him under this agreement shall be without force 
and effect; (c) the Trustee shall have power and authority on 
such incapacitateS^Trusfor^sor Trustee's behalf to exercise 




whatsoever that such Trustor^ or Trustee may have, relating to 
any person, matter, transaction or property, real or 
personal, tangible or intangible, whether in the trust estate 
or owned by Trustor or Trustee including, without limitation, 
power to transfer to himself as Trustee upon the terms set n 
forth in this agreement any property owned by Trustor or ^K iAb^fU/k 
Trustee* The power granted to the Trustee under (c) above r LA 
shall be construed and interpreted as a general durable power 
of attorney to act as such Trustor's attorney in fact and 
agent xn his name and for his ben&JLit and shall be in 
addition to all other powers bestowed upon the Trustee by 
this agreement. 
3. -^Restor^tTgn^ofy<3apaoi-ty. If at any time after 
the determination of incapacity""under subparagraph 1 the 
Trustee shall receive a written statement signed by such 
Trustor's or Trustee's personal physician (or a specialist 
approved by such personal physician, or any two other 
licensed physicians) that such Trustor or Trustee is no 
longer so mentally or physically incapacitated as to be 
substantially unable to manage his financial resources and 
affairs effectively or to resist fraud or undue influence, 
then such Trustor or Trustee shall no longer be deemed to be 
incapacitated and the provisions of subparagraph 2 shall 
cease to apply. If the Trustee other than such Trustor or 
Trustee shall object to such physician's statement, the 
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Trustee may institute proceedings to determine capacity 
before any appropriate court and such Trustor or Trustee 
shall no longer be deemed to be incapacitated unless and 
until a court having jurisdiction has determined that such 
Trustor or Trustee is in fact incapacitated. Restoration of 
capacity pursuant to this article or such a finding by a 
court having jurisdiction over such proceedings shall not 
automatically restore Trustor as a Trustee under this 
instrument. 
L. ACCRUED INCOME ON TERMINATION OF INTEREST 
Other than income required to be paid to the 
surviving Trustor, income accrued or in the hands of the 
Trustee for payment to an income beneficiary at the termina-
tion of the beneficiary's interest shall go to the 
beneficiaries entitled to the next succeeding interest in the 
proportions in which they take such interest* 
M. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
The Trustee shall have no responsibility for any 
tangible personal property transferred to the Trustee under 
the terms of this instrument for so long as either Trustor 
shall retain the use and possession of such property. The 
Trustee shall be responsible only for such property as may be 
physically delivered to it. 
N. ADMINISTRATION WITHOUT COURT SUPERVISION 
Each trust created by this instrument shall be 
administered free from the continuing supervision of the 
court having jurisdiction over the trust; provided, however, 
that the Trustee or any beneficiary may petition the court 
for judicial settlement of an accounting or for any other 
proper purpose, 
0. REPORTS TO BENEFICIARIES 
Periodic reports shall be rendered by the Trustee 
to each beneficiary eligible to receive the current income, 
showing the assets then held as the principal of the trust 
estate and all of the receipts, disbursementsr and 
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distributions during the period. Such reports shall be 
rendered not less frequently than annually. Reports to any 
beneficiary who is under a disability may be rendered 
directly to such beneficiary or to any parent, guardian, or 
conservator, or to any adult person with whom the beneficiary 
resides, except that no report under any circumstances shall 
be made to JERRY THOMAS TULAK or his relatives (excepting 
beneficiaries). 
P. AMENDMENT 
This Trust may be amended only in writing by 
Trustor during her lifetime, provided that she may not amend 
to the benefit of any creditor of hers. After the death of 
the Trustor, this may be amended by a writing concurred in by 
at least two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining beneficial 
interest* 
ARTICLE XII 
PROVISIONS REGARDING LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
A. PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS 
During the lifetime of Trustor, the Trustee shall 
be under no obligation to pay any premiums or other charges 
necessary to keep in force any insurance policy in the trust 
estate or in which the Trustee is named beneficiary, nor to 
determine whether the same have been paid or to notify anyone 
of the non-payment thereof. Following the death of the 
Trustor, the Trustee shall have the responsibility to pay 
premiums and other charges on any life insurance policy owned 
by the Trust, The Trustee shall keep safely each insurance 
policy assigned to or deposited with the Trustee. 
B« COLLECTION OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS 
Upon the death of Trustor, the Trustee shall use 
reasonable efforts to collect the proceeds of any insurance 
on the life of the Trustor and any other benefits payable by 
reason of the Trustor's death. The Trustee shall have full 
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authority to take any action it deems advisable in regard to 
collection, and shall pay the expenses of collection, 
including the expense of any litigation, out of the principal 
of the trust estate. The Trustee shall have full authority 
to make any compromise or settlement with respect to the 
policies and benefits and, if it electsr may exercise any 
settlement options under any policy. The Trustee may give 
all necessary and proper releases of liabilities; the receipt 
of the Trustee to the insurer shall be a full discharge and 
the insurer is not required to see to the application of any 
proceeds• The proceeds of any policy shall become principal 
of the trust estate, except interest paid by the insurer, 
which shall become income. 
ARTICLE XIII 
GOVERNING LAW 
This trust has been accepted by the Trustee in the State 
of Utah and, unless otherwise provided in this instrument, 
its validity, construction, and all rights under it shall be 
governed by the laws of that State. 
Executed at St. George, Utahf on the 
1992. 
JAEET PACE PEREZ ~gT 
Trustor 
Accep ted on t h i s /^T% day of J6\A&T*. tut, 1 9 9 2 . 
*JAl*ET PACE PEREZ 
ROBERTA JE^N.FLOORNOY 
GALLIAN* 6C W E S T F A L L 
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roy-od a s t o F o r m 
LIAN & WESTFALL 
// 
? X i s s e l l J . G a l l i a n 
vTE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
FNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
On t h e / < T ^ ~ d a y o f ^ ^ ^ A v J r 1 9 9 2 , p e r s o n a l l y 
>ea red b e f o r e me J a n e t P a c e P e r e z a n d R o b e r t a J e a n 
j u r n o y
 f the signers of the within instrument, who duly 
mowledged to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Commission Expires Residing at: 
.s>a-e . / xl~ 
3 t ? >>'" 
$ 
* 1 , • • , 1 V * . _ 
. • * *-' ~i . • , -
v
» V i t T ~ 
I 
< 
. J # * 
• ' ' 
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I f l » l SCHEDULE "A" 
REAL PROPERTY LOCATED 12? KANE COONTT S T A T E O F UTAH 
-^-rwtfTMG
 a c che West Quarter Comer of Section 4, Township 44 South. Range ^ - ^ 6 , v 
S S ^ S J t Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 1.320.0 reVc;, chance ^ c 
E " - ' 9 4 O " 5 feet; thence South 40.-25 feet; thence East -L22.5 feet ; thence Souch 
1-30' West 572.8 feet, more or leas , to the Ranald R- Smith property; thence 
Llr 78 7 /etc- thence South 75.44 feet; thence West 33.0 feet; thence Souch 
! 5 , C c e n L t 66.0 feet; thence South 267.97 feet; thence We« 33.0 feet; 262.52 feet thenc ^ ^
 1 / 1 6 c h ^ ^ t h & ^ w&sz ^ ^ f e f i c 
a l ^ r s a i d l i n e ° « the West line of said Section 4; thence North 1.320.0 feet along 
said line to the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER with a right-of-way over and across the following described property: 
„ r 7 W T „ r a _ _ D o i n C w h ± c h i s North 337.96 feet and East 1.047.673 feet from the 
7^^,iL^T^T^^J7^\s.S ««« tW. *.« r.375.0 «.« « ,h. 
point of beginning. 
RESERVED however, therefrom a road easement granted to Kanab Creek Ranchos. Inc. , 
! S « S i to l e t ter agreement dated September 13, 1975. described a. rollcvs: 
f ^ l ; : ; g S ^ a n a T c i t y l « . . « . North 88'22«30' Ease 700.0 feet, .ore 
or less to the point where the City right-of-way changes direction to Che Northeast. 
A tu!!' „-.„,- che srre-t rizht-of-way line continues Southeast to the East property-
l L f £ c t ' ro " t y ; S i n e . South 60.0 feet to a point which i s North 337.96 
fett and T „ C L , 0*7.67 feet from the West quarter Comer of Section 4 Township 44 
South. Range 6 West. Salt Lake Base and Heridian; thence running Northwest to allow 
\ To a foot street right-of-way to intersect with a right-of-way line 10.0 feet 
SoSth of the c i ty u c d l 7 easement; thence South 88' 22"50 ' West 700.0 feet; chence 
Horthwe't to the Northeast7 Corner of Lot 1423, Unit 6, Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision 
which v±ll create an easerneut for the excension of Navajo Drive in an Easterly 
direction to 'the public streec West of the Kanab /Lirporr. 
T0CETQER VITE a l l improvements and
 Eppurtenances appertaining thereto, including ^ « -
Kunuo Sicy Hccct uiettL- and thrct City sewer hookups. 
Df<L 
j u ^ c ^ ^ * ~ i - ( -x>.yS- £-*'-" 
7/ 
/ / '&C 
2>75" 
SCHEDULE A 
See copy of Deed attached 
W rESTFALL 
U N S C L O r f S A T L A W 
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-THIS IS A LEGALLY BINI ' CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEE* ^  MPETENT ADVICE ' 
Recorded fit Bluest of G a l l i a n S Wp.sffflll • Onp iS • Main, S t - G e o r g e , Ut—84770 
at -M Fee Paid $ — — • 
by Dep Book_ Page. Ref :„ 
Mail Ux notice »* \lr^e>t P R P P Perm— Address p , O—Box 19321/ Lag Vegas , NY—89132-0321 
<§uit-(Elatm 5*ri> 
of Las Vegas 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
JANET PACE PEREZ 
, grantor, 
County of Clark »Stateqfl&fy hereby 
Nevada 
the ATTICUS FAMILY TRUST, under Agreemeat dated September 15, 1992, 
Janet Pace Perez and Roberta Jean Flournoy, Trustees grantee, 
of 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Kane County, 
State of Utah 
(See Exhibit A-attached) 
Q 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 15 th 
t AD , one thousand rune hundred and n i n e t y - t w o . 
day of 
Signed in the presence of 
neuuaarcu anu ninety-tWO „ 
Janet Pace Perez 
< ^ 2 ^ ^ 
i ss













2 ^ UJ O 
STATE O F UTAH
 p ^ ^ _ 
COUNTS OF
 W M h l n g t o n ^ J ^ ^ 
On the 5^" "2s. cay of ^j^t^rrU^O^'^^ \ ^ ^ •1 9 ^-*~ »personally appeared before me 
Janet Pace P e r e z * "^J* >;£~AT«.'* ,* \ ,designer of the within instrument, who 
dJy acLnouled£ed to me that
 s he executed th£ samej*, ~i ? ? £ ^ 1 ,* 
\ ^ ' 3 ^ ^ ^ ^  N0Ur> ?UbIlC j * / ^ * - * * * ^ ^ 
My CormnissKn Expires /~ ff- ?</
 v . ^ 1 ^ R ^ g at Jfr* ^ r ^ £ ^ | P E 2vL9m| R ' S 
APPROVED rOILM-UTAH SECURfriES COMMISSION / ^ | EXHIBIT 
F01 10. 1 - Q L 1 T K . 1 A . 4 X DLXD — K e J j O i i U NinLh South S L C UUh 534 
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